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This article offers a critical analysis of 
the  Arab Human Development Report 
(AHDR) 2016,  that was released by the 
United Nations Development Programme 
in November 2016.  AHDR 2016  repre-
sents the return of the Arab Human 
Development project that had been inter-
rupted by the Arab Spring uprisings of 
2011. It also epitomizes the Arab youth 
paradigm that has increasingly come to 
frame development and security dis-
course in the region. While there is much 
that is familiar in AHDR 2016, there are 
also concerning developments: a histori-
cal revisionism that holds Arab youth 
responsible for the Arab Spring and the 
Arab Spring responsible for the Arab 
Winter that followed, and a new trend 
that views not just Arab youth deficits as 
a dangerous threat to regional and global 
security, but Arab youth abilities and sur-
feits as well.
Keywords: Arab Human Development 
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Introduction
In November 2016, the long overdue Arab 
Human Development Report (AHDR) 2016 
was finally released by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). With the 
subtitle Youth and the Prospects for 
Human Development in a Changing 
Reality, AHDR 2016 was the first of a total 
of six Arab Human Development Reports 
that have been produced since 2002 to 
focus exclusively on the question of youth 
in the region, looking at youth in relation 
to civic participation, education, work, 
gender, health, war and conflict, mobility 
and migration. As Sophie de Caen, 
Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab 
States in UNDP, said at the launch of AHDR 
2016: “The wave of uprisings that have 
swept across the Arab region since 2011 
has shown us that we can no longer treat 
young people in the Arab region as pas-
sive dependents or a generation in wait-
ing.” Fadlo Khuri, president of the 
American University of Beirut, who spoke 
at the launch event of AHDR 2016, said 
that “I look at our youth with optimism 
because I think there is a sense of resil-
iency and a sense that this youth is not 
waiting for the grand intervention of the 
western states, or even the great universi-
ties, or the United Nations, to save them. 
They want us to help them; that is very evi-
dent in this report.   But they don’t want 
FOCUS 70
The Rise of the Arab Youth Paradigm: 
A Critical Analysis of the Arab Human 
Development Report 2016
Mayssoun Sukarieh
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
FOCUS 71
saving. They want support, they want 
opportunity, they want to save them-
selves” (quoted in Jafari) 
While AHDR 2016, like previous reports in 
the AHDR series, has received widespread 
coverage in the media, and attention and 
support from a range of different develop-
ment and policy organisations, it demands 
far more critical attention than it has been 
given to date. This article thus offers a 
close, critical reading of AHDR 2016, situ-
ating it in the context of the AHDR series 
as a whole, but also in relation to what we 
might call the rise of the Arab youth para-
digm in development policy and dis-
course in the Arab region, a paradigm that 
increasingly shapes development policies 
and practices across the region, and that 
impacts the lives not just of Arab youth but 
people from all generations in the Arab 
world. AHDR 2016 thus follows in the foot-
steps of a growing number of parallel 
reports that have focused on Arab youth 
as a key development concern over the 
past decade, including the Brookings 
Center’s Middle East Youth Bulge: 
Challenge or Opportunity?, the RAND 
Corporation’s Initiative for Middle Eastern 
Youth and the United Nations’ The 
Millenium Development Goals in the Arab 
Region 2007: A Youth Lens. This paper 
argues that AHDR 2016 epitomizes the 
Arab youth and development paradigm. 
However, while there is much that is famil-
iar in the report, there are also some con-
cerning new developments: a historical 
revisionism that holds Arab youth respon-
sible for both the Arab Spring and the 
Arab Winter that followed, and a new 
trend that views not just Arab youth defi-
cits as a dangerous threat to regional and 
global security, but Arab youth abilities 
and surfeits as well. 
The Arab Human Development Report 
Regime 
The Arab Human Development Reports 
(AHDR) have been produced by the 
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) since 2002, with a total of six 
reports (AHDR 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 
2009; 2016) appearing over the past fif-
teen years. Each report focuses on a key 
topic considered to be central to develop-
ment concerns in the region – knowledge 
(AHDR 2003), freedom (AHDR 2004), gen-
der (AHDR 2005), human security (AHDR 
2009), and most recently, youth (AHDR 
2016) – and typically proceeds by identify-
ing a series of “challenges,” “obstacles” or 
“problems” that confront the Arab world 
and proposing a set of recommended 
“principles” and policy recommendations. 
While the UN produced several national 
and subnational development reports on 
Arab states prior to 2002, it explained the 
launch of the regional development 
reports by arguing that “recent events and 
tragedies” in the Arab world meant “the 
time is right for a study that assesses the 
current state of human development 
across the region and offers some con-
crete suggestions on how to accelerate 
progress in the future.” It stated that the 
goal of the reports was to spur “discussion 
and debate by policymakers, practitioners 
and the general public alike” and “help 
Arab countries to continue to advance the 
fundamental purpose of development” 
(Brown, ADHR 2002 iii-iv). It is notable that 
the Arab region is the only region in the 
world for which the UNDP has felt it neces-
sary to produce regionally focused devel-
opment reports (although the organiza-
tion has produced global development 
reports on an annual basis since 1990). 
When launching its AHDR series, the 
UNDP emphasized from the beginning 
that the reports would not be written by 
“normal, internal UN authors,” but instead 
would be “authentic” works produced “by 
Arabs for Arabs,” released simultaneously 
in both Arabic and English (Brown, ADHR 
2003 i). UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch 
Brown (iv) notes in his foreward to the first 
AHDR that “it is independent experts from 
the region rather than the UNDP who have 
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placed their societies under a sympathetic 
but critical examination … in a way that 
perhaps only Arabs should,” and insists 
the report “is not the grandstanding of 
outsiders but an honest, if controversial, 
view through the mirror.” The use of Arab 
researchers based in the Arab world for 
producing the AHDR series has continued 
ever since. The release of each AHDR has 
been accompanied by high profile public 
launches and large media campaigns – 
“great fanfare,” as Levine puts it. AHDR 
2016, for example, was launched at the 
American University of Beirut in November 
2016 in an event that brought together 
“150 participants including youth; civil 
society and women’s organizations; gov-
ernment representatives; parliamentari-
ans; and the private sector, from across 
the Arab region” (UNDP, AHDR 2016); and 
then again at follow-up launch events in 
Stockholm in March 2017 and Brussels in 
April 2017, in collaboration with the 
European Commission and the EastWest 
Institute (UNDP, AHDR 2016). 
In many ways, the UNDP’s Arab Human 
Development Report series has been an 
enormously successful enterprise. All of 
the series reports have been widely used 
– the UNDP records over a million down-
loads of each report – and just as impor-
tantly, have tended to be primary sources 
quoted frequently not just by academics 
in and of the region, but Arab business 
and political leaders as well (Amin; 
Traboulsi; Trebilcock). There are a number 
of likely reasons for this: the extensive 
media promotion of the reports by the 
UNDP and other organizations, the status 
of legitimacy provided by the combina-
tion of UNDP sponsorship and Arab 
authorship, and the fact that the reports 
are one of the few sites where large 
amounts of statistical data on the Arab 
world have been made freely and easily 
accessible (Abu Lughod, Amin; Bayat, 
Trebilcock). The AHDR series, therefore, is 
particularly important to pay close and 
critical attention to because it has become 
so central to the political construction of 
knowledge in and about the Arab region. 
Bayat argues that “no comparable Arab 
document in recent memory has been as 
much debated, commended and con-
tested as the AHDR;” (1227) while 
Trebilcock claims that the AHDR has 
“attracted more attention and controversy 
than any other official studies of develop-
ment in recent years.” (1)
Despite, or perhaps precisely because of 
their extended success and influence, the 
AHDR series has attracted a small but 
growing number of critics over the fifteen 
years that it has been in existence. 
Criticisms have focused on the way in 
which the AHDR series has been pro-
duced, the uses of the series, particularly 
by western governments and international 
organizations, and more substantively, the 
content and claims of the series, in par-
ticular the representations of the Arab 
world that the series helps to promote. In 
contradiction to UNDP claims of the inde-
pendent and indigenous nature of AHDR 
authorship, Arab authors who have 
worked on the AHDR series over the past 
decade and a half have repeatedly com-
plained of censorship, editing and lack of 
overall control. Islah Jad, who was one of 
the authors of ADHR 2005, felt compelled 
to issue a statement that she “is not fully 
the owner of the report” (Jad); the release 
of ADHR was actually delayed by the 
UNDP because some of its claims “were 
politically controversial and not in line with 
the organization” (AHDR 2005 vi). Likewise, 
with AHDR 2016, the authors of one chap-
ter wrote publicly to say that they were 
“surprised by the final edits” of their chap-
ters, claiming that “ambassadors of differ-
ent countries were involved in the editing 
of the report” (Al-Ali et al.). 
The use of the AHDR series by the United 
States, other western governments and 
international organisations has also 
caused considerable criticism and suspi-
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cion. The first AHDR was directly commis-
sioned by the United States government 
in the context of the war on terror (per-
sonal interview with Clovis Maksoud, April 
2006). The series overall has been used as 
a platform for international intervention in 
the region, widely quoted by US and EU 
leaders and officials to legitimate and 
support the various programmes and 
policy reforms they were sponsoring 
throughout the Arab World (Baroudi; 
Trebilcock). Bayat argues that policy per-
sonnel in the west and notably the US 
used the AHDR to call “for an urgent 
change in the region and yet believe that 
change will not come from within, but 
from without, and by force.” 
Finally, a number of scholars have focused 
on the problematic representation of the 
Arab world that is promoted by the AHDR 
series. The series has tended to embrace 
a culturalist framework of analysis, in 
which in which culture is central and con-
stitutive in explaining the demise of 
human development in the Arab region 
(Abu-Lughod; Baroudi; Said; Traboulsi). 
Most of the reports refer to a set of core 
and unchanging “traditional” values and 
practices that are said to be at odds with 
the practices of modernity and pressures 
and forces of a globalizing world. This 
ignores the extent to which “traditions” 
are themselves constantly reimagined 
and reinvented as a constitutive part of 
the modern, globalized world (Lavergne; 
Traboulsi). Bayat argues that the AHDR 
series represents the region as “some-
thing very different, a unique cultural 
entity which does not fit into conventional 
frames of analysis.” Further, the AHDR 
focuses on institutional and cultural defi-
cits that are said to separate the Arab 
world from every other global region and 
claims that these deficits (in knowledge, 
freedom, democracy, women’s empower-
ment, etc.) form the center of its social, 
economic, and political backwardness 
(Hasso). The sweeping invocation of gaps, 
lacks, and deficits between the Arab and 
western worlds perpetuates ungrounded 
Orientalist stereotypes of the region. 
Traboulsi claims that the region is pre-
sented as a set of “lacks, lags and deficits, 
to an extent that one does not know what 
the Arab region has, it is only what it does 
not have that is presented” (see also Abu-
Lughod). 
In general, there is an absence of attention 
to and criticism of external interventions in 
the ADHR series, either from the US and 
other powers in the current period, or of 
colonial powers during the period of 
European imperialism and colonialism. 
Amin explains the denunciation of the 
report by many Arab intellectuals by its 
“exclusive emphasis on internal sources of 
decline as one-sided, totally ignoring the 
role of colonialism and imperialist inter-
vention causing the developmental mal-
aise of the Arab people” (see also Baroudi). 
When we turn from the AHDR series’ anal-
ysis of problems to its proposed solutions 
for the Arab region, we find that the 
reports are broadly linked to an ideologi-
cal model of neoliberal development. In 
report after report, the series strongly pro-
motes the (further) liberalization of Arab 
national economies and societies in order 
to secure good governance, growth, and 
consequently, human development. Amin 
argues that both AHDR 2002 and AHDR 
2003 begin with a culturalist analysis of 
the Arab region and end up with a neolib-
eral solution. Abu-Lughod and Adely both 
argue that the AHDR-promoted policies 
for women’s empowerment are neoliberal 
in orientation. Traboulsi also talks about 
the AHDR series as ending with a “neolib-
eral wishlist” as solutions for development 
problems in the Arab world. 
The Rise of the Arab Youth Paradigm
The Arab Human Development Report 
2016 needs to be situated not just within 
the context of previous Arab Human 
Development Reports, but more generally 
within the context of a broad political and 
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ideological discourse that has focused on 
and indeed, helped to construct the idea 
and central importance of Arab youth in 
the region’s policy and development 
debates. As youth studies research has 
noted, the social category and identity of 
youth is not universal, and has tended to 
be most relevant in the wealthy countries 
of the global North (Boyden, et al.; Brown, 
Larson and Saraswathi; Finn; Griffin; 
Nsamenang). Up until a few decades ago, 
the social category of youth was of limited 
relevance in most of the countries in the 
Arab region. There were few, if any, NGOs 
working with youth specifically, and nation 
state youth policies and ministries were 
essentially unheard of; academic research 
rarely considered the issue of Arab youth, 
as studies of class, family and faith were 
much more central (Al-Amin). 
All of this began to change from the 1990s 
onwards for two reasons. First, youth has 
become increasingly central to develop-
ment discourse, policy and practice, not 
just in the Arab world but on a worldwide 
scale. This shift is perhaps best marked by 
the World Bank’s decision to dedicate 
its 2007 World Development Report 
(subtitled Development and the Next 
Generation) entirely to the question of the 
place of youth in global development 
agendas. Second, both youth and devel-
opment together have increasingly come 
to be seen as central to regional and 
global security concerns (LaGraffe; 
Sukarieh and Tannock, “The Global 
Securitization”). While this has also been 
a global phenomenon, it has focused in 
particular on Arab and Muslim youth, 
spurred on by the participation of young 
Arabs in the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in the 
United States and, more recently, in 
enabling the growth of ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq (Bzina and Gray). As a result of these 
shifts, both the Arab region and other 
parts of the world have seen a phenom-
enal explosion of state-led youth policy 
initiatives, youth-focused development 
projects, youth-oriented NGOs and youth 
policy documents (African Union; ILO; 
USAID; World Bank, Children & Youth). In 
Jordan, for example, NGOs tailored to 
youth grew in number from one in 1990 to 
15 in 1998, and to 83 in 2014.
Why has youth become a central develop-
ment and security concern in the Arab 
world and beyond? According to AHDR 
2016 (and other parallel reports in the 
youth, security and development dis-
course), there are two straightforward 
explanations for this. One factor is the 
presence of rapid demographic change: 
the extreme growth in the numbers of 
youth in Arab societies and emergence of 
what is commonly referred to as a “youth 
bulge.” AHDR 2016 thus notes that there 
has been an “unprecedented” demo-
graphic “wave,” “mass” and “momentum” 
in the Arab world caused by the fact that 
“young people between the ages of fif-
teen and 29 make up nearly a third of the 
[Arab] region’s population” (22). “Never 
before has the region had such a large 
share of youth,” the report explains, as 
“youth of the ages 15-29 make up around 
30% of the population, or some 105 mil-
lion people” (22). The second factor is the 
widespread marginalization, disempower-
ment and exclusion of youth in public and 
private sector decision making through-
out the Arab region. As AHDR 2016 claims:
The exclusion of youth is pervasive 
throughout the Arab region…. The mass 
disenfranchisement of youth constitutes 
one of the key stumbling blocks in the 
development process in Arab countries. 
Young people have not been recognized 
as legitimate agents of change, nor have 
they been empowered to fulfil this respon-
sibility…. [Y]outh are formally excluded 
politically by middle-aged and elderly 
men, who dominate society because of 
traditional norms and deeply entrenched 
state-sponsored economic practices. 
Youth also face large entry barriers to jobs, 
marriage and housing, where older 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
FOCUS 75
groups enjoy privileges, largely acquired 
under public programmes during the oil 
booms. (32, 170)
However, despite such an appealing nar-
rative of youth empowerment and con-
cern, this positive and positivist account 
needs to be looked at carefully and criti-
cally, as there are a number of problems 
and concerns with the new youth devel-
opment and security paradigm. First, as 
can be seen in the quotation above, the 
youth paradigm foregrounds claims of 
generational conflict and inequality as 
central dimensions of inequality in Arab 
societies, while backgrounding other 
issues of social class, race, gender, reli-
gion or regional relations of inequality 
between the global North and South. 
Attention is focused on the exclusion of 
youth by “middle-aged and elderly men,” 
and the inequities of “older groups” enjoy-
ing “privileges” that the young do not 
have access to. Second, the youth para-
digm is closely linked with a strong attack 
on the public sector – “state-sponsored 
economic practices” and oil-funded “pub-
lic programme” privileges in the above 
quotation – and corresponding promotion 
of the private sector. In fact, the youth 
paradigm poses an alleged affinity 
between the core interests of youth (get-
ting a good education to help them get 
good jobs) and those of private sector 
elites (securing a reliable and productive 
workforce for their enterprises). The attack 
on the Arab public sector is a constant 
throughout the document. Since indepen-
dence, the report claims, most Arab coun-
tries have “pursued a model of develop-
ment that is dominated by the public 
sector and turns governments into provid-
ers of first and last resort” (175). The domi-
nation of the public sector is claimed to be 
the cause of the lack of strong enterprises 
and culture of entrepreneurship: “for the 
public sector has either crowded out and 
manipulated the private sector or forged 
uncompetitive and monopolistic alliances, 
while inhibiting the development of viable 
systems of public finance” (29). The solu-
tion proposed by AHDR 2016, in the name 
of empowering youth, is very much a stan-
dard neoliberal wish list, that includes 
labour market deregulation (73), capital 
control and trade liberalization (30), and 
privatization and marketization (29).
Finally, despite the ostensible embrace 
and celebration of youth, the youth para-
digm also promotes negative stereotypes 
of youth as problems, pathologies and in 
deficit. One of the core concerns of AHDR 
2016 is that the combination of a youth 
bulge and youth exclusion has led to a 
prevalence of “frustration, helplessness, 
alienation and dependency” among Arab 
youth, and it is Arab youth discontent with 
their social and economic position that 
has become “an explosive and radicalizing 
mixture” that threatens the entire region 
(5, 22). More generally, one of the effects 
of promoting a youth framework of analy-
sis for addressing social, cultural, political 
and economic problems in Arab societies 
is that social development is presented as 
being dependent upon the individual 
development of young Arabs. Thus, 
emphasis is placed on extending and 
reforming formal and informal education 
systems in order to provide youth with the 
knowledge and skills (that they are pre-
sumably now lacking and that are causing 
them problems) that will enable them to 
succeed in civil society, the labor market 
and the political sphere. According to 
AHDR 2016, “only a small minority of 
youth” have “adequate skills to meet the 
demand of labour markets;” while most 
Arab youth suffer from “limited skills,” 
“inadequate skills” and “poor human cap-
ital endowments” (24, 31). AHDR 2016 is 
consequently littered with calls for a wide 
range of educational reforms that will 
meet the needs of Arab youth and Arab 
employers alike, such as “reorganizing 
university curricula, assuring quality ter-
tiary education and expanding vocational 
training programs” (76), expanding “career 
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guidance and matching services,” and 
“supporting entrepreneurship skills 
amongst youth” (83). While such kinds of 
educational interventions may well pro-
vide a range of benefits for individual 
young Arabs across the region, if social, 
political and economic problems are not 
primarily caused by educational skills def-
icits among Arab youth – which, as will be 
discussed below, is what AHDR 2016 itself 
often seems to argue – then these prob-
lems are not likely to solved by educa-
tional interventions either (see Sukarieh 
and Tannock, Youth Rising 55-74). 
The Arab Spring and the New Historical 
Revisionism
AHDR 2016 offers a third account of why 
youth has become a central development 
and security concern in the Arab world 
today. The combination of the youth 
demographic bulge and youth economic 
and political marginalization has led to 
youth (allegedly) playing a growing role in 
social and political unrest throughout the 
region. “The events of 2011 in the Arab 
region have refocused attention on the 
pivotal role of youth … in society,” AHDR 
2016 states, and “the wave of protests 
which has swept through a number of 
Arab countries since 2011 with youth at the 
forefront” constitutes a “key argument” for 
why a focus on youth has become such a 
social, economic and political imperative 
(5, 7). Thus, according to AHDR 2016:
While this report represents a natural 
progression from earlier Arab Human 
Development Reports, it has been 
drafted within quite a unique context. 
Since 2011, several countries in the re-
gion witnessed uprisings, and the re-
gion has experienced the most rapid 
expansion in war and violent conflict 
among all global regions over the past 
decade. (170)
In this respect, AHDR 2016 is part of a 
much broader set of reports, books and 
articles that has focused recently on youth 
as a threat to social, economic and politi-
cal stability and security, both in the Arab 
world and beyond. These include, for 
example, the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace 
and Security; the Final Report of the 
Global Forum on Youth, Peace and 
Security (held in Amman, Jordan in August 
2015); and the report of the Global Youth 
Summit Against Violent Extremism (held in 
New York City in September 2015) 
(Sukarieh and Tannock, “The Global 
Securitization”).
The claim that the combination of the 
youth bulge and youth marginalisation 
and exclusion is responsible for violence, 
unrest and instability in the Arab region 
needs to be questioned and critiqued for 
the negative and inaccurate stereotypes 
of youth that this claim tends to promote. 
As Anne Hendrixson notes:
The youth bulge is most often perso-
nified as an angry young brown man 
from Africa, the Middle East or parts of 
Asia or Latin America. He is often por-
trayed as Muslim, susceptible to ext-
remism, and sometimes driven by his 
very biology to unrest. This stereotype 
is an example of what anthropologist 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls “dange-
rous discourses” that over-predict indi-
vidual acts of youth violence, even as 
they downplay the role of other forms 
of violence and structural inequalities 
that contribute to youth poverty and 
powerlessness. (2)
AHDR 2016 is more moderate in its por-
trayal of youth as being particularly sus-
ceptible to violence and disorder than 
some other youth bulge texts (for exam-
ple, Cincotta and Doces, the age Structural 
Maturity Thesis): while “youth, especially 
young men … are often depicted as espe-
cially prone to violence,” the report 
observes, “most young people do not 
engage in violence” (143). Nonetheless, 
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we can still find echoes of such negatively 
stereotyped language in the report. It is a 
combination of “less control over life, a 
greater space for self-expression and a 
lower prevalence of obedience to author-
ity” that led Arab youth to spearhead the 
recent period of unrest that swept across 
the region, according to the report (59). 
These and other such claims of increased 
youth susceptibility to violence and con-
flict are widely challenged in the youth 
studies literature (e.g., Arnett; Offer and 
Schonert-Reichl). 
But more than this, there is also a concern-
ing historical revisionism at play here. First, 
there is the claim made throughout AHDR 
2016 that the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 
were youth-led events. This, of course, is 
how the Arab Spring has widely been por-
trayed right from the very beginning of the 
emergence of the first protests, as a “youth 
revolt,” “youth uprising” or “youth quake” 
(Al-Momani; Sadiki; Zill). This portrayal, 
however widespread it may have become, 
it also highly inaccurate. For while many 
young Arab men and women were abso-
lutely central participants in the Arab 
Spring protests, there were multiple other 
groups and actors from across Arab civil 
society that were also directly involved 
with the uprising, including trade unions, 
peasant movements, poor people’s orga-
nizations, women’s groups, political par-
ties and Islamist and faith-based move-
ments (Dahi; Joya et al.; Korany; Soliman). 
By framing the Arab Spring as a youth 
phenomenon, we obscure the presence 
and leadership of these other groups, 
erase their concerns and agendas, and 
miscontrue the broader nature and sig-
nificance of the uprising for the Arab 
region as a whole. Such a framing also 
helps to suggest a much narrower set of 
responses to the protests (e.g., promoting 
educational reforms, etc.) than might oth-
erwise be expected.
Second, and even more alarming, is the 
blurring together in AHDR 2016 of both 
the Arab Spring uprisings and their often 
violent aftermath – a blurring together that 
effectively holds Arab youth responsible 
not just for the Arab Spring, but also for 
the counter-revolution and so-called Arab 
Winter that followed. For example, the 
opening pages of AHDR 2016 are framed 
by a direct link between Arab youth and 
the extensive regional instability and vio-
lence of the previous five years:
The report underlines that the wave 
of protests which has swept through a 
number of Arab countries with youth 
at the forefront has led to fundamental 
transformations across the entire regi-
on…. Systems which had maintained 
stability came under serious challenge, 
with protracted conflict ensuing. (5)
Similarly, AHDR 2016 closes with a parallel 
statement that again ties Arab youth to 
regional conflict and war:
This Report examines the problems 
and challenges of youth in light of the 
recent [Arab Spring] uprisings…. Since 
2011, several countries in the region 
witnessed uprisings, and the region 
has experienced the most rapid expan-
sion in war and violent conflict among 
all global regions over the past deca-
de…. The exclusion of youth is pervasi-
ve throughout the Arab region … [and] 
ignited uprisings across many Arab 
countries in late 2010 and early 2011, 
causing some to descend into social 
and political instability and deep eco-
nomic uncertainty. (170) 
This blaming of Arab youth for the pro-
tracted violence and unrest in the Arab 
region following the 2011 Arab Spring 
effectively leads to the complete erasure 
of the responsibility of other actors in Arab 
society for such violence—in particular, the 
forces of counter-revolution, includes the 
old regimes, political and business elites, 
neighboring and western states, and inter-
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national organisations (Al-Rasheed; 
Kamrava; Nuweihed and Warren). Indeed, 
far from being key perpetrators of vio-
lence and conflict, youth in the Arab world, 
as elsewhere, are often much more likely 
to be some of the principal victims of vio-
lence being committed against them by 
ruling elites and their supporters 
(Sommers). All of this revisionism is an 
example of what might be called the 
“youth ruse” (Sukarieh and Tannock, 
“Youth Ruse”). In the guise of supporting 
and empowering youth, the embrace of 
the youth frame in documents such as 
AHDR 2016 is actually used to import a 
whole set of problematic analyses and 
responses that are prejudiced against and 
harmful to the young men and women 
that such a framing is ostensibly supposed 
to protect.
Shifting Concerns Around Arab Youth: 
From Deficit to Surfeit?
There is another framing in AHDR 2016 
that marks a further shift from the previous 
series of Arab Human Development 
Reports. From the beginning of the AHDR 
series, the prevailing framework for por-
traying the Arab region, as noted earlier, 
has been a language of deficit, lack, lag 
and backwardness. AHDR 2016, as has 
already been pointed out, likewise pro-
motes a stereotyped discourse of youth 
deficits, problems and pathologies as pre-
senting a major challenge for develop-
ment in Arab countries. However, at the 
same time, there is also a counter-dis-
course in AHDR 2016 that argues that 
problems in the Arab region today are 
being caused not so much by deficits in 
Arab youth, but what we might term sur-
feits – an abundance or excess of skills, 
abilities, knowledge, insight, aspiration 
and ambition. First, Arab youth are repeat-
edly referred to in AHDR 2016 as the most 
highly educated generation in the history 
of the region. The report begins by stating 
that “today’s generation of young people 
[in the Arab world] are more educated, 
active and connected to the outside world, 
and hence have a greater awareness of 
their realities and higher aspirations for a 
better future” (8). Second, Arab youth are 
also repeatedly referred to in AHDR 2016 
as being highly networked – both within 
the Arab region and externally with the 
rest of the world – active on social media 
and technologically savvy:
Through their access to information 
and communication technology, youth 
[in the Arab region] are increasingly 
connected to the world…. [T]his expo-
sure to information and communica-
tion has been a liberating portal and 
a virtual space to express themselves, 
raise objections, voice their opinions 
and challenge power structures, thus 
transforming them from passive mem-
bers of society into active, self-aware 
and reform-driven individuals. (27)
Third, more generally, Arab youth are 
referred to as being highly aware and 
ambitious, as “the progress in some areas 
of human development over the years has 
tended to elevate the expectations of 
people in Arab countries” (24). 
All of these shifts might be expected to be 
cause for celebration – particularly in the 
context of the long litany of complaints 
about Arab deficits and deficiencies 
throughout the rest of the AHDR series. 
Paradoxically, however, these apparent 
successes are instead presented in AHDR 
2016 as a danger and threat to the Arab 
region as a whole, and a potential cause 
of social and political instability and unrest. 
The rise of the “most well-educated” gen-
eration in the Arab region’s history, AHDR 
2016 warns, may “constitute a destabilizing 
force,” “an overwhelming power for 
destruction,” and a threat that is reshaping 
“the region’s security landscape” (8, 28, 
170). The reason for this, according to 
AHDR 2016, is the tension and conflict 
between the high levels of education, 
knowledge and skill, aspiration and expec-
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tation among Arab youth, on the one 
hand, and the sharply limited social, polit-
ical and economic opportunities available 
to the majority of youth in most Arab 
countries, on the other. Thus, “young peo-
ple’s awareness [in the Arab region] of 
their capabilities and rights collides with a 
reality that marginalizes them and blocks 
their pathways to express their opinions, 
actively participate or earn a living” (8). 
Because Arab youth “enjoy fewer oppor-
tunities than their parents to convert their 
skills into higher living standards,” and as 
a consequence, “possess so little hope of 
achieving tangible progress,” their educa-
tion and ability becomes not a resource or 
benefit to the Arab world, but a danger 
and threat that needs to be channelled 
and contained (170).
What we are seeing here in AHDR 2016 are 
some of the first signs of cracks in the neo-
liberal development model that has con-
sistently promoted more education, infor-
mation, skills and knowledge as the 
standard solution for both individual and 
societal development. In what Brown, 
Lauder, and Ashton refer to as the “broken 
promises of education, jobs and incomes,” 
formal institutions of education have been 
pressured to deliver universal opportuni-
ties for social and economic mobility in an 
environment where there are simply not 
enough high quality, engaging and well 
remunerated jobs – or jobs of any kind, 
quite simply – to go around. This is not just 
happening in the Arab region, but glob-
ally, as the spectre of graduate unemploy-
ment and underemployment – and the 
threat of social, economic and political 
instability that the thwarted expectations 
and ambitions of highly educated and 
capable graduates presents – becomes a 
regular topic of discussion in political, 
media and public discourse (Guardian; 
Jeffrey et al.; Mason). Particularly in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, concerns 
about the problem of over-education and 
under-employment, previously seen dur-
ing the early years of the rise of mass 
higher education in the 1960s, have once 
again returned (Bills; Green). Business and 
political leaders now talk not just of need-
ing to raise the aspirations of young peo-
ple, but of having to tackle the sense of 
entitlement among the young, and of 
managing and even lowering their expec-
tations (Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth 
Rising 69-70). As Drine writes of the Arab 
region, one of the central development 
problems currently is that there is a “mis-
match between what the labour market 
offers, and what young people expect.” 
Part of the response to this situation is to 
argue that even though Arab youth are 
highly educated and skilled, they have the 
wrong kinds of education and skills, and 
thus education and training needs to be 
tied more closely to the needs and inter-
ests of employers – as discussed above. 
But the fact that it is now the high levels of 
education, technological integration and 
ambition that are being constituting a key 
youth challenge raises one of the most 
important questions for the Arab region, 
and indeed the global South, over the 
coming decade. How will these be 
addressed effectively? What lasting sig-
nificance will this shift from a concern with 
youth deficits to claims about youth sur-
feits have for the Arab region and beyond?
Conclusion
The past decade has seen the rise of dif-
ferent discourses around youth in the 
Arab world, from the war on terror and 
discourse of Arab youth as terrorists, to 
the Arab Spring and construction of Arab 
youth as freedom fighters and revolution-
aries, to the current period, where Arab 
youth are once again seen as a dangerous 
threat, liable to plunge countries into 
extended periods of instability, conflict 
and crisis. What is constant in all these dif-
ferent constructions of Arab youth over 
the past decade is the fact that youth has 
been a trope through which elite agen-
das, anxieties, concerns and interests are 
projected. In this sense, AHDR 2016 is part 
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of a larger pattern that views youth, 
whether positively or negatively, both as 
a threat to the contemporary social and 
economic order in the region, and also as 
a useful rhetorical frame to call for rein-
forcements of this prevailing social and 
economic order. What this article argues 
is that, if we are break out of this pattern, 
we need to develop much greater critical 
reflection about the particular ways in 
which the youth frame is mobilized in 
policy and development discourse in the 
Arab region, and more generally, across 
the world. The promise of more critical, 
political economy based studies of youth 
is that not only will we be able to develop 
a better, more grounded understanding 
of the current situation of youth in the 
Arab region, but we might also be better 
able to push for new, creative and alterna-
tive development policies and programs 
that will benefit not just Arab youth, but 
individuals of all age groups in the Arab 
world as well.
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